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Commentary

The Reemergence
of Nuisance Law
in Environmental
Litigation
By Alan Weinstein*

In the summer of 1980, Chicago's beaches were fouled by raw
and inadequately treated sewage, allegedly discharged into
Lake Michigan by the Hammond (Indiana) Sanitary District.
Clearly, Illinois and Chicago officials wanted to stop pollu
tion of the lake. Surprisingly, they turned to the common law
of nuisance, rather than to a regulatory agency or a statutory
citizens' suit to obtain relief, charging the city of Hammond
and the sanitary district with violations of the Illinois common
law of nuisance.
While planners are generally familiar with the application
of common law nuisance doctrines to resolve disputes be
tween conflicting uses of land, there is less familiarity with
nuisance actions to abate environmental pollution. Yet prior
to the enactment of comprehensive environmental regulations
in the early 1970s, nuisance actions were used to challenge
pollution of the air, water, and land by both industrial and
municipal activity .1 Further, legislators and judges looked to
nuisance law as a guide to the formulation and interpretation
of new environmental regulations, in much the same way that
nuisance doctrines provided the framework for zoning. 2 In
fact, in the early years of the environmental movement that
emerged in the 1960s, nuisance law, along with a number of
other legal doctrines, was touted as an effective way to deal
3
•
•
,
with pollution problems.
The advocates of nuisance pomted out that economists
definition of pollution as a negative externality fits well with
nuisance doctrines concerning unreasonable interference with
property rights; that nuisance, because of its historical associa
•Alan Weinstein is an a ttomey and assistant professor of urban planning
at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. Larry Wolinsky, a third-year stu
dent at New York Law School, provided research assistance.
1. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100 (1977).
2. In Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 36S (1926), the land
mark Supreme Court case upholding the constitutionality of zoning regula
tions, Justice Sutherland's opinion explicitly noted the role nuisance.law ~hould
play in shaping the new law of zoning: "In solving doubts, the maxim szc utere
tuo ut alien um non laedes, which lies at the foundation of so much of the com
mon law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew. And the
law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the purpose of control
ling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the
scope of, the [zoning] power."
3. See, e.g., Klipsch, Aspects of Constitutional Rights to a Habitable En
vironment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 lNo.L.J. 203 (1974);
Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, SB VA.L.REv.193 (1972);
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Law: Effective Judicial Interven
tion 68 M1cH.L.REv. 471 (1970); Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241
(1971); McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the Environmental
Battle: We/I-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds? 10 OsGOODE HALL L.J. SOS
(1972).

tion with equity jurisdiction, made injunctions readily
available to halt polluting activities; and that the case-by-case
approach of the common law, which judges each individual
lawsuit on its own merits, would allow courts in nuisance ac
tions to tailor remedies to the particular circumstances of each
pollution episode. But nuisance also had serious shortcomings
that limited its effectiveness to combat pollution, particular
ly when compared with the comprehensive pollution control
regulations provided by federal law.
Unlike regulatory programs, which typically require per
mits and periodic reporting to ensure compliance prospective
ly, nuisance can only cure pollution retrospectively; there can
be no nuisance action until a pollution episode has occurred.
In contrast with regulatory agencies, which have a technical
staff of scientists, engineers, and planners to fashion pollution
control strategies, nuisance actions are heard in courts of
general jurisdiction where few, if any, of the judges and
lawyers have technical training. The case-by-case approach
of nuisance law is also prohibitively expensive when com
pared with regulatory programs that can address all like
situated cases with a single set of regulations.
The hallmark of the environmental legislation of the 1970s
was a system of uniform national standards to control pollu
tion. While this approach has been criticized by economists
who favor various tax- or fee-based pollution control
strategies, it has remained in place because of two distinct ad
vantages: relative ease of administration and certainty. Under
a uniform standard approach, both regulators and potential
polluters know how much pollution must be abated, and com
pliance may readily be monitored. If a polluter does not meet
the standards specified in his permit, the regulatory remedy
is an "enforcement action," usually prosecuted in state court,
that will prescribe the steps the violator must take to achieve
compliance. To avoid problems, the polluter need only meet
the requirements of his permit.
The availability of nuisance actions potentially conflicts
with these legislative goals of uniformity, ease of administra
tion, and certainty. A polluter sued on a nuisance claim, which
is independent of the regulatory program, has no guarantee
that his record of compliance with permit standards will earn
a favorable ruling. This is not only unfair to the permit holder
who complied in good faith with his permit only to find a
nuisance action filed against him, but also can deter speedy
compliance with permit standards, as polluters may delay
meeting their permit obligations to see whether someone
might initiate a nuisance lawsuit.
On the other hand, nuisance law historically has served to
"fill in the gaps" left by more comprehensive legislative
schemes and, arguably, could still be used to remedy pollution
problems overlooked by legislators and regulators. In 1980,
Illinois could sue Hammond on federal and state common law
nuisance grounds as well as federal and state statutory
grounds. Today, that is no longer the case. In the past three
years, a number of court decisions have redefined the relation
ship among state and federal statutory and common law
nuisance remedies for environmental pollution. In this article,
we explore these developments and their implications for the
future availability of common law nuisance as a remedy for
pollution.
Ironically, our exploration begins with an earlier Illinois
allegation of out-of-state pollution of Lake Michigan. In 1972,
Illinois charged that Milwaukee was polluting Lake Michigan
Land Use Law March 1984

3

Commentary
through the discharge of vast quantities of raw and inade
quately treated sewage.4 Illinois initially brought suit against
Milwaukee in the U.S. Supreme Court, charging Milwaukee
with violating the federal common law of interstate water
pollution. The motivation behind the Illinois nuisance action
was undoubtedly the shortcomings of the then existing federal
water pollution legislation.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), first
enacted in 1948 and substantially amended in 1956and1965,
approached water pollution problems through ambient water
quality standards tailored to particular bodies of water.
Responsibility for developing and enforcing these standards
rested with the states. Interstate water pollution became sub
ject to FWPCA under the 1965 amendments, but the enforce
ment process-a series of conferences that sought amicable
settlements of pollution problems-was cumbersome and in
efficient. The failure of this statutory interstate pollution
abatement procedure led Illinois to invoke nuisance doctrines
against Milwaukee.
The Supreme Court, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1972), declined to hear Illinois's
suit, holding that Illinois could sue Milwaukee in federal
district court un.der the federal common law of interstate water
pollution. The Court's decision in Milwaukee I was a land
mark because, for the first time, the Court expressly held that
the federal common law of nuisance could govern an action
concerning interstate water pollution. At the same time, the
Court also recognized the potential for confict between such
nuisance actions and statutory programs. Justice Douglas's
opinion noted that: "It may happen that new federal laws and
new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of
federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass,
federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of
suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water
pollution."5
As Justice Douglas noted, a major issue in the conflict be
tween common law and statutory remedies is the preemption
doctrine. Preemption refers to the power a legislature has to
exclude other remedies, such as common law nuisance, from
an area of law that it has undertaken to regulate comprehen
sively. Preemption may occur at the federal or state levels.
There may be federal preemption of federal common law,
federal preemption of state statutory law, or state preemption
of local regulation or state common law. In Milwaukee I, the
preemption issue had been whether the then existing FWPCA
would preempt Illinois's federal common law claims against
Milwaukee, and the Court ruled against preemption, allow
ing Illinois to sue Milwaukee under the federal common law
of nuisance. Accordingly, on May 19, 1972, Illinois filed its
complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, seeking abatement of the Milwaukee
sewage discharges under the federal common law of nuisance.
Five months later, Congress, recognizing that "the Federal
water pollution control program ... has been inadequate in
every vital aspect," 6 enacted a comprehensive reform of the
4. Illinois, in fact, named as defendants not only the City of Milwaukee,
but the cities of Kenosha, Racine, and South Milwaukee, Wisconsin; the
Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee; and the Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee County. Kenosha, Racine, and South
Milwaukee subsequently settled out of court.
5. 406 U.S. at 107.
6. City ofMilwaukeev. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451U.S.304at310 (1981).
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FWPCA that made it illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants
into navigable waterways without a permit. Milwaukee, com
plying with the new requirement, received permits from the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which
had qualified as a permit-granting agency under FWPCA. The
question posed in Douglas's opinion was now squarely at
issue. Would this new comprehensive statutory program
preempt the newly created federal common law of nuisance?
Milwaukee raised the preemption issue on a motion to
dismiss the Illinois complaint but the motion was denied in Il
linois v. Milwaukee, 366 F.Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973), allow
ing the Illinois nuisance lawsuit to remain before the court.
After three years of discovery, trial commenced in January
1977. While this trial on the nuisance claim was proceeding in
federal district court, the Wisconsin DNR initiated an enforce
ment action against Milwaukee in state court-as provided for
in the FWPCA-alleging that the city was not fully comply
ing with its permit requirements. In May 1977, the state court
entered a judgment requiring that Milwaukee's sewage
discharges meet the effluent limitations stated in the DNR per
mits and establishing a detailed timetable for the construction
of a system to control overflows of raw sewage into Lake
Michigan.7 Less than six months later, the federal district
court issued its own judgment order. The federal court found
that Milwaukee's sewage discharges constituted a nuisance
under federal common law and ordered Milwaukee to meet
effluent limitations well beyond those specified by the DNR
permits and to adhere to an even more stringent timetable to
correct the overflow problem.8
The potential conflict between statute and nuisance was
now fully realized. Milwaukee in late 1977 faced two separate
court-imposed mandates, one based on the statutory
guidelines under FWPCA, the other founded on the novel
claims of the federal common law of nuisance. Two years
later, the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, ruling on
Milwaukee's appeal of the district court's judgment, closed the
distance between the statutory and common law remedies
somewhat, but upheld the lower court's finding that the 1972
amendments to the FWPCA had not preempted the federal
common law of nuisance .9 Other federal courts faced with
the preemption issue also held that the FWPCA left in
tact the federal common law of nuisance enunciated in
Milwaukee J. 10
Milwaukee continued its fight, however, and was granted
a second hearing by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980. In April
7. Sewerage Commission v. State (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. of Wis. No.
152-1342, May 25, 1977). The overflows of raw sewage were caused by the
limited hydraulic capacity of a combined system of storm and sanitary sewers
in older sections of Milwaukee. In wet weather, the increased flows of storm
water overloaded the combined sewers, which also carried human waste. To
prevent sewage from backing up into homes, the combined sewer system con
tained a number of overflow outlets that relieved the pressure by discharg
ing flows of stormwater and raw sewage directly into streams and Lake
Michigan, bypassing the treatment facilities entirely.
8. Illinoisv. Milwaukee, N.D. Ill. No. 72-C-1253, ("Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law," July 29, 1977) (Judgment Order, November 15, 1977).
9. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). The court ruled that
Milwaukee did not have to go beyond the effluent limits specified in the DNR
permits, stating that "[i]n applying the federal common law of nuisance in a
water pollution case, a court should not ignore the Act but should look at its
policies and principles for guidance." Id. at 164. The lower court's stringent
timetable for correction of overflows was left in place, however.
10. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 340 n.9.
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1981, nine years after Milwaukee I created the federal com
mon law of nuisance for interstate water pollution, the
Supreme Court, in Milwaukee//, held that the 1972 amend
ments to the FWPCA preempted the federal common law of
nuisance. The case has received substantial comment11 and we
will not attempt here to provide a critical analysis of the ma
jority and dissenting opinions. Our focus is rather on the ef
fect this decision is having-and is likely to have-on pollu
tion abatement actions based on federal and state common
law nuisance theories.
Will the Common Law of Nuisance Survive Milwaukee II?
The Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee II raised a
number of important issues about the future of environmen
tal common law nuisance actions. Three of the more signifi
cant issues are: What is the scope of Milwaukee II as it applies
to the FWPCA? What is the impact of Milwaukee II on federal
common law of nuisance actions brought in areas governed
by environmental legislation other than the FWPCA? Have
state as well as federal common law of nuisance remedies been
preempted by environmental legislation? The remainder of
this article exmaines how the courts are resolving these
questions.
The Scope of Milwaukee II as Applied to the FWPCA
The decision in Milwaukee II left unclear whether the FWPCA
completely preempted the federal common law of nuisance in
the field of water pollution. However, this confusion was
short-lived. Just two months after Milwaukee II, the Supreme
Court decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea ClammersAssociation, 453 U.S. 1(1981),33 ZD
255, answered the question. In Sea Clammers, a group of com
mercial fishermen, suing under the federal common law of
nuisance and other theories, alleged that the defendant was
polluting fishing grounds in the Atlantic Ocean and thereby
causing them economic harm. The Court rejected the
fishermen's federal common law of nuisance claim, holding
that Milwaukee II was to be read as "entirely" preempting the
federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution.
Lower federal court decisions have further defined the reach
of Milwaukee II in nuisance actions that conflict with the
FWPCA. In United States v. Olin, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 21026
(D .C. Ala. 1981), the United States brought a federal common
law nuisance action seeking to abate discharges of DDT. At
issue was whether Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers were ap
plicable to nonpoint- as well as point-source discharges. The
court, after extensively quoting from Milwaukee II, effectively
held that the FWPCA was comprehensive enough to preempt
federal common law nuisance actions against nonpoint
source polluters.
In People of Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473
(7th Cir. 1982), the retroactivity of Milwaukee II was at issue.
The court examined the FWPCA' s legislative history and con
cluded that Congress, in enacting the 1972 amendments, had
considered the residual effects of pre-1972 discharges. Thus,
11. See, e.g., City of Milwaukeev. Illinois(l//inoisll), lOEcoLOGYL.Q.51
(1982); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of Federal Common Law
Nuisance Actions in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 35 S.W. L.J. 1097
(1982); Environmental Law: States May No Longer Bring a Federal Common
Law Nuisance Action to Abate Interstate Water Pollution. 7 U.DAYTON L. REv.
511 (1982); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Com
mon Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 627.

the federal common law of nuisance could not survive as a
cause of action for water pollution incidents prior to 1972,
since Congress expressly intended the FWPCA to govern past
as well as future pollution episodes.
The Impact of Milwaukee II on the Relationship of Federal
Common Law to Other Pollution Statutes.
Although Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers clearly established
that the FWPCA preempts a federal common law of nuisance
action brought against a water polluter, they did not address
the status of federal common law nuisance actions brought
against an air polluter or landfill operator. Are these actions
also preempted by the relevant federal statutes, the Clean Air
Act (CAA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)? The courts have begun to address these questions
and are beginning to determine what remains of the federal
common law of nuisance after Milwaukee II.
The Clean Air Act
In New England Legal Foundation v. Cost le, 666 F.2d 30 (2d
Cir. 1981), 34ZD140, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Long Island Lighting Co. based on
violations of the CAA and the federal common law of
nuisance. Although the Second Circuit's holding did not ad
dress whether the CAA totally preempted federal nuisance ac
tions, the court in dictum intimated that federal common law
nuisance actions involving air pollution might be looked at
differently from actions to abate water pollution. Specifical
ly, the court noted that the CAA differs substantially from the
FWPCA since under the FWPCA the EPA regulates every
point source of water pollution but under the CAA, the states
and the EPA are only required to control those sources of air
pollution that threaten ambient air quality standards. By
noting these differences, the court implied that the CAA is not
as "all comprehensive" as the FWPCA and for that reason
might not "entirely" preclude a federal common law of
nuisance action to abate an air polluter.
In contrast to New England Legal Foundation, the court in
United States v. Kin-Bue, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 699 (D.N.J.1982),
34 ZD 266, held that the CAA does totally preclude a federal
common law of nuisance action. In this case, the United States
sought damages under the federal common law of nuisance for
air and water pollution emanating from a landfill. Defendants
moved for summary judgment with respect to the air pollu
tion claim, arguing that the FWPCA and CAA were "sister
statutes," and that in light of Milwaukee II the CAA must
therefore logically preclude a federal common law of nuisance
action. The court rejected this argument by stressing the dif
ferences between the two acts. However, the court also re
jected the idea that th-e absence of a direct conflict between the
CAA and the federal common law means that a federal com
mon law action can be maintained. Citing Milwaukee II, the
court said that the proper test to apply "is whether the scope
of the legislative scheme established by Congress is such that
it addresses the problems formerly governed by federal com
mon law." The court then examined the legislative history of
the CAA and concluded that it establishes a complete
regulatory procedure that, when administered by an expert
agency, obviates the need for federal common law. Thus,
''since Congress addressed the problem of air pollution in the
CAA that statute preempts a federal common law claim for
nuisance."
Land Use Law March 1984
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RCRA
The effect of RCRA on the federal common law of nuisance
has also been at issue in recent cases. In U.S. v. Price, 523
F.Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), the United States sought an in
junction to remedy hazards posed by chemical dumping,
bringing the action under the federal common law of nuisance
as well as other theories. The court, relying on Milwaukee I,
held that the chemical dumping was intrastate in all respects
and therefore there was no proper basis for development of
federal common law in this area. The court nevertheless
elected to address the preemption issue and stated that:
. . . even if this was an appropriate area for federal common
law, any such common law has been preempted by the enact
ment of RCRA and more recently the Comprehensive Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CRCLA) . . . The
comprehensive nature of the schemes established by RCRA and
CRCLA require us to conclude that if federal common law ever
governed this type of activity it has since been preempted by
those statutes.

Is There Still a State Common Law of Nuisance for
Pollution Episodes Governed by Federal Environmental
Legislation?
We now can see that the federal courts will no longer allow
lawsuits based on the federal common law of nuisance where
there is a comprehensive federal pollution control statute. But
what about lawsuits based on state common law of nuisance?
The constitutional test for showing preemption of state law
differs significantly from that for preemption of federal com
mon laws. Thus, the fact that Milwaukee II and subsequent
cases found that comprehensive statutory programs to abate
pollution preempt the federal common law of nuisance does
not necessarily mean that state common law actions are also
preempted. The federal courts that have considered state com
mon law of nuisance laws since Milwaukee II are split on the
issue.
The litigation between Illinois and Hammond illustrates the
differing views the federal courts have taken. Three separate
lawsuits charged Hammond with violating the Illinois com
mon law of nuisance. The first two lawsuits, filed by the state
of Illinois and Illinois's former Attorney General, William
Scott, were decided together in Scott v. City of Hammond,
519 F.Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill.1981), 34ZD11. In Scott, the court
ruled that state common law of nuisance claims were not
preempted by the FWPCA. In reaching this decision, the court
stated that "where there is no separate common law but only
federal statutory law, the statute must be examined to deter
mine whether Congress intended to make these pollution con
trol matters solely a federal question."
Since the FWPCA expressly allows states to adopt and en
force standards more stringent than the statutory re
quirements, and also provides for''citizen suits" that expressly
reserve "any right which any person (or class of persons) may
have under any statute or common law," the court argued that
Congress could not have intended to make interstate pollution
control solely a federal matter. The court dismissed Ham
mond's argument that the FWPCA preempted both federal
and state common law by noting the differing standards for
preemption: "Hammond's arguments concerning preemption
do not withstand analysis. When the Milwaukee II Court
described the scope of federal legislation it did so in the con
text of determining whether federal legislation replaced federal
6 March 1984 Land Use Law

common law. The Court expressly recognized that the test for
that displacement was less demanding than the clear intent test
for preemption of state law."
But in the third lawsuit in the Hammond litigation, brought
by the Chicago Park District, the court held that the FWPCA
did preempt both federal andstate common law of nuisance.
Chicago Park District v. Sanitary District of Hammond, 530
F.Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. 1981). This court argued that: "It would
be bizarre to hold that state law claims against out-of-state
dischargers were preempted by federal common law but not
by the comprehensive federal statute that has in turn pre
empted that federal common law. Uniformity in the interstate
regulation of pollution is a concern of the same magnitude
whatever form the federal response may take." In this deci
sion, the court clearly relied on the reasoning of Milwaukee
I that "Federal common law and not the varying common law
of the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to
be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with
the environmental rights of a State against improper impair
ment by sources outside its domain." Although these con
flicting decisions have been appealed to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, that court still has not rendered a decision,
leaving Illinois's common law claims against Hammond still
in dispute.
Where Are We?
In the three years since the Supreme Court's ruling in
Milwaukee II, some trends have emerged. First, it is clear that
the federal common law of nuisance may no longer be the
basis for a lawsuit to abate interstate water pollution. Second,
although relatively few cases have considered whether the
federal common law of nuisance may be used to challenge air
pollution or solid and hazardous waste problems, the courts
are generally barring nuisance lawsuits for alleged RCRA or
Clean Air violations.
When we consider the availability of state common law of
nuisance lawsuits, there is no clear trend to be discerned. The
litigation between Illinois and Hammond has gone both ways
on the issue, and the Seventh Circuit has not yet decided
whether state law has been preempted. It is quite possible that
the courts will adopt a "middle ground," neither wholly
preempting nor wholly permitting state common law of
nuisance lawsuits, but rather restricting nuisance lawsuits to
damage claims. Under this "middle ground" theory, a court
would hold that comprehensive pollution control legislation
would preempt state common law of nuisance actions that
sought to enforce stricter standards than those mandated by
environmental regulations, but would allow nuisance lawsuits
'that sought damages for alleged pollution episodes.
This "middle ground" has already been suggested by one
federal court. In Chappel v. SCA Services, 540 F.Supp.
1087 (C.D. Ill. 1982) residents of Wilsonville, Illinois, were
seeking to recover damages for property losses and personal
injuries that resulted from the operation of a hazardous waste
landfill. The federal court, although remanding the case to the
Illinois state courts for lack of federal jurisdiction, noted that
the citizen suit provisions of federal pollution control statutes
apparently did not provide any right to damages for private
citizens injured by pollutant discharges. Since the federal com
mon law of nuisance was clearly preempted by federal
statutory law, a state common law nuisance action may thus
be the only way that plaintiffs can recover for any damages
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they have suffered. In this situation, the court reasoned that
state common law nuisance actions for damages were not
preempted by federal pollution control statutes.

Conclusion
In the past decade, we have witnessed the birth, growth, and
now, apparently, the demise of the common law of nuisance
as an alternative to federal statutory remedies for pollution.
While nuisance was a potentially useful approach to particular
pollution problems, its costs, the uncertainty of outcomes in
nuisance litigation, and most critically, the potential for con
flict between standards mandated by statute and standards
derived from nuisance lawsuits are powerful policy argu
ments for the preemption of the common law of nuisance
by comprehensive federal environmental legislation.
These policy arguments are far less compelling when we
consider common law nuisance as a means for recovering

damages for private plaintiffs harmed by polluters. A nuisance
action for damages alone does not conflict with statutory
policy where the alleged harm was caused by a polluter's viola
tion of federally mandated standards. The courts may find it
more difficult to weigh the equities where damages are sought
for harms caused by discharges or emissions expressly permit
ted under those same standards, but allowing such actions
could further the aims of environmental policy. Since the
plaintiffs in such actions-challenging a legislatively permit
ted activity-would face a very high burden of proof, we
should not expect a flood of such litigation. The few cases that
were brought might then prove very useful by increasing our
sophistication regarding pollution costs. In this way, nuisance
law could continue to serve its historical equity function
without causing undue conflict in our environmental policy,
but at the same time it could slowly influence that policy by
developing a body of knowledge regarding pollution costs
derived from the resolution of individual cases.
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